Obergefell's Audiences by Schacter, Jane S.
Obergefell’s Audiences 
JANE S. SCHACTER* 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 1011 
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF OBERGEFELL AND THE DEBATE  
 THAT PRECEDED IT .................................................................... 1013 
III. MULTIPLE AUDIENCES ............................................................... 1016 
A. Professional Legal Audience .............................................. 1016 
1. Lawyers and Lower Courts ........................................... 1016 
2. The Court’s Role in a Democracy ................................ 1019 
B. The Public as Audience ....................................................... 1021 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION ............................................... 1033 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Obergefell v. Hodges1 was a blockbuster by almost any measure. It 
resolved one of the most high-profile social and cultural debates of the day. It 
created a new fundamental right or extended an existing one—depending on 
whom you ask—for the first time in decades. It reflected in self-conscious 
fashion on the very purpose of a constitution. It seems uncontroversial to say 
that it will enter the pantheon of Fourteenth Amendment landmarks—along 
with decisions like Brown v. Board of Education,2 Loving v. Virginia,3 Roe v. 
Wade,4 Lawrence v. Texas,5 and others. There are similarities and differences 
between and among these cases, but all of them used the Fourteenth 
Amendment to confer significant rights, and all were contested, albeit to 
varying extents and in varying ways. Obergefell’s sibling, United States v. 
Windsor,6 belongs on this list as well, though it was technically decided under 
the Fifth, not Fourteenth, Amendment.
7
  
What influence will Obergefell have? What are its doctrinal implications? 
How will the opinion be viewed in history? Such questions are commonly 
asked about a new landmark decision. Framed in this way, though, these 
questions are too general to be useful, for there are multiple audiences for 
Supreme Court opinions and they are likely to look at the opinion through 
                                                                                                                     
 * William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I am grateful 
for the research assistance of Kate Fetrow, Michael Skocpol, and Reece Trevor.  
 1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).   
 4 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 5 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 6 See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding the 
Defense of Marriage Act’s definition unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment). 
 7 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal government through the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause).  
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different lenses. In the case of Obergefell, lawyers, litigants, lower court 
judges, public officials, activists, interest groups, media observers, and 
scholars are all likely to be interested in the case. What about the broad 
public? Is it, too, a meaningful audience for the Court’s opinions? There is a 
rich tradition of scholarship that gives pride of place to this idea and casts the 
Court as a critical teacher of constitutional values.8 That view might hold 
special sway in the context of a case as exceptionally salient as Obergefell.  
In this Article, I will focus on two kinds of audiences for Obergefell. I will 
call the first a conventional legal audience and include here lawyers, lower 
court judges, and constitutional law scholars. These observers would likely 
bring to the decision questions about what the case means for constitutional 
doctrine and future cases, what it might reflect about the role of courts in 
producing social change, and what it tells us about the contested boundary line 
between democratic decision-making and judicial review. The second 
audience I will consider is the broad public, by which I mean the lay, non-
lawyer public. This public audience is the focus of the didactic view of the 
Court, in which the Justices are tasked with being a “republican 
schoolmaster[]”9 or teacher of a “vital national seminar.”10 The lay public is, 
in other words, the object of those who think the Court writes opinions that 
teach the country about constitutional values. How, if at all, were any 
teachings of this kind transmitted, and what lessons might this audience have 
taken from Obergefell?  
My purpose in proceeding in this fashion is, in part, simply to emphasize 
that there are multiple audiences for the Court’s work, and that it matters in 
assessing a major opinion which perspective is brought to bear. Moreover, 
juxtaposing these audiences suggests some ways in which the fact that the 
Justices are writing for multiple audiences can help to shape their opinions.  
In Part II, I very briefly summarize the same-sex marriage debate and the 
Obergefell opinions. In Part III, I examine the majority opinion and some of 
the dissents from the perspective of the two audiences I have identified. I 
begin with the conventional legal audience. I focus first on the opinion’s 
doctrinal elements, and next on the debate among the Justices about a classic 
question: whether the Court acted appropriately in judicially resolving one of 
the most hotly contested cultural debates of its time. I then turn to the public 
audience for Obergefell, reviewing some of the prominent themes reflected in 
responses to the opinion by public figures and by non-lawyers on the Internet 
and through social media in particular. In Part IV, I briefly consider how the 
public’s increased access to the Court’s work might bear on the Justices’ 
elaboration of doctrine and their role in democracy—that is, on matters of 
interest to its more conventional audience. 
                                                                                                                     
 8 Classic accounts include Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican 
Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127, and Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character 
of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952).  
 9 Lerner, supra note 8, at 180.  
 10 Rostow, supra note 8, at 208. 
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II. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF OBERGEFELL AND THE DEBATE THAT 
PRECEDED IT 
Obergefell settled a long running controversy in this country about the 
right of same-sex couples to marry.11 It was essentially a play in three acts.
12
 
The first act began in 1993, when the Hawaii Supreme Court was poised to 
declare a right to marry under the equal rights amendment in the State’s 
constitution,13 though it never actually did so. The mere suggestion was 
enough to produce a massive backlash, including the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) and what, over time, came to be some forty state law 
analogues of varying sorts.14 That consumed most of the first decade, with 
only a Vermont decision leading to the creation of civil unions representing a 
major legal step forward for same-sex couples.15  
The second act spanned from 2003 to 2013, and it began and ended with 
extraordinary victories for LGBT rights. In 2003, the Supreme Court 
overturned sodomy bans in Lawrence v. Texas16 and, a few months later, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court became the first to find a state 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage in the pathbreaking decision 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.17 That decision was followed by 
legal defeats and victories for marriage equality, along with intensifying 
legislative and political debates. Those political debates increasingly involved 
fights over whether and how religious liberty should be preserved in states that 
enacted same-sex marriage.
18
 In 2013, the Supreme Court took the dramatic 
step of declaring DOMA unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor.19 The 
                                                                                                                     
 11 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605–07 (2015). 
 12 Citations for this chronology appear in Jane S. Schacter, Commentary, What 
Marriage Equality Can Tell Us About Popular Constitutionalism (and Vice-Versa), 52 
HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1154–62 (2015) [hereinafter Schacter, What Marriage Equality Can 
Tell Us]. See also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, 
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013); Jane S. Schacter, 
Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1165–75 (2009) [hereinafter Schacter, Courts and the Politics of 
Backlash].  
 13 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the bar to same-sex 
marriage must be reviewed by the lower court under a strict scrutiny standard), abrogated 
by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.  
 14 See David Masci & Ira C. Lupu, Overview of Same-Sex Marriage in the United 
States, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/07/overview-of-
same-sex-marriage-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/E59S-FZRM] (noting that forty 
states legislated against same-sex marriage and many also enacted constitutional bans). 
 15 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the state constitution 
entitled same-sex couples to equal rights, whether called marriage or something else).  
 16 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
 17 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
 18 Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based 
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2558–65 (2015). 
 19 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
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majority opinion cursorily deferred for another day the question whether there 
was a federal constitutional right to marry in every state,20 but Windsor plainly 
teed up that question. It turned out that it did not take long to get the answer.  
The third act began with the post-Windsor filing of federal court marriage 
equality cases in states all over the country, the vast majority of which 
succeeded.21 The most significant exception was the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
upholding bans on same-sex marriage in Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, and 
Tennessee.22 That case ultimately brought Obergefell to the Court. It is worth 
noting that, as I have argued elsewhere, when Obergefell did reach the high 
Court, the marriage debate had by that time involved virtually every branch of 
government, state and federal.23 Courts, legislatures, governors, attorneys-
general and voters themselves through ballot initiatives (and in one case a 
contested judicial retention election) had participated at various points.
24
 When 
Obergefell was argued, thirty-seven states allowed same-sex couples to 
marry.25 Some states had adopted same-sex marriage through legislative or 
voter action, though more had done so because of constitutional rulings by 
state or federal courts.26 While the state supreme court decisions had begun 
with Goodridge in 2003, the federal rulings were much more recent and had 
come in a rapid and compressed wave of post-Windsor decisions in favor of 
marriage equality.27  
The Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision in Obergefell, striking down four state 
laws that prevented the licensing and/or recognition of same-sex marriages, 
was thus the culmination of more than two decades of noisy legal, political and 
cultural debate. The principal basis for Justice Kennedy’s conclusion was the 
substantive due process-based notion of a fundamental right to marry.28 His 
opinion acknowledged that “[i]t cannot be denied that this Court’s cases 
describing the right to marry presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex 
partners” before concluding that “[t]he limitation of marriage to opposite-sex 
couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the 
central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.”29 There 
was a heavy dose of living constitutionalism in this approach, which the 
opinion made explicit by saying that “[t]he nature of injustice is that we may 
                                                                                                                     
 20 Id.  
 21 Schacter, What Marriage Equality Can Tell Us, supra note 12, at 1160.  
 22 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 418 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d, Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 23 Schacter, What Marriage Equality Can Tell Us, supra note 12, at 1175–82.  
 24 Id. at 1172–82.  
 25 Julia Zorthian, These are the States Where SCOTUS Just Legalized Same-Sex 
Marriage, TIME (June 26, 2015), http://time.com/3937662/gay-marriage-supreme-court-
states-legal/ [https://perma.cc/5ZAZ-WZ7Y].  
 26 Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash, supra note 12, at 1192–93.  
 27 Id. at 1201–03. 
 28 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2585 (2015). 
 29 Id. at 2598–602. 
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not always see it in our own times.”30 The embrace of evolving constitutional 
norms reinforced the majority’s assertion that it was not constrained by 
Washington v. Gluckberg,31 an important precedent that had limited the reach 
of substantive due process doctrine by requiring courts to find historical 
protections for claimed rights.32  
In addition to relying on the fundamental right to marry, Kennedy 
sprinkled in references to equal protection33 and emphasized—though did not 
clearly explicate the basis for—the “synergy between,” and “interlocking 
nature of,” liberty and equality.34 The idea that banning same-sex marriage 
denied couples and their children dignity—a familiar theme for Justice 
Kennedy
35—suffused the opinion and can be assimilated to ideas of both 
liberty and equality.36 He closed the opinion on this theme, asserting that 
same-sex couples “ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The 
Constitution grants them that right.”37  
The dissents by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia mostly pressed claims 
of judicial activism that focused on the idea that the Court had usurped what 
should have been a majoritarian decision. Roberts, for example accused the 
majority of “stealing” the issue from the people.38 In a dramatic rhetorical 
flourish, he asked: “Just who do we think we are?”39 Scalia pursued similar 
arguments, ratcheting up the rhetorical level further and calling the majority 
decision a “judicial Putsch”40 achieved by a non-democratic body comprised 
of “nine unelected lawyers,”41 and a “pretentious” and “egotistic” opinion that 
would lead him to “hide [his] head in a bag” if he ever signed it.42 In his 
dissent, Justice Thomas focused on the meaning of liberty and contested the 
premise that the government could either confer or deny dignity.43 Justice 
Alito most emphatically worried about stifling and stigmatizing those who 
opposed marriage equality on religious grounds.44  
                                                                                                                     
 30 Id. at 2598. 
 31 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 32 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 33 Id. at 2602–05. 
 34 Id. at 2603–04. 
 35 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003); cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (invoking dignity in the context of race). 
 36 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603–04. 
 37 Id. at 2608.  
 38 Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 41 Id.  
 42 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 & n.22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 43 Id. at 2631–40 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 44 Id. at 2640–43 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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III. MULTIPLE AUDIENCES 
A. Professional Legal Audience 
1. Lawyers and Lower Courts 
There is much to ponder if we look at the opinion and ask what traditional 
legal audiences will make of it. Most fundamentally, the question is how the 
case will be understood by lower courts and litigators, and how it will push 
and shape the doctrine. As is always the case, answers to these questions must 
await future application of Obergefell by lawyers and judges. Still, many 
important issues fairly leap off the pages of the opinion. To name a few: did 
the case categorically overrule Washington v. Glucksberg
45
 and lay down a 
newly flexible marker for all fundamental rights? Is the due process–equal 
protection “synergy” stressed in the opinion a doctrinal innovation that will 
make a difference in future cases? What is the core idea of that synergy? Is it 
protecting “equal dignity,” as the end of the majority opinion suggested?46 Or 
is it something more like “equal liberties?”47 Is “synergy” a nod to the small 
but important body of decisions that travel under the name of equal protection-
based fundamental interests?
48
 If so, why was that not noted? Does the absence 
of any reference to “animus” in the opinion signal the abandonment of that 
idea in equal protection, notwithstanding the prominent role that it played in 
Romer v. Evans49 and Windsor,50 the Court’s two biggest equal protection 
decisions concerning sexual orientation?51 While Obergefell made no 
reference to standard of review, did it nevertheless plant the seeds for 
heightening scrutiny for purposes of equal protection analysis at a later point? 
It is conceivable that it did so by touching on elements commonly used in 
traditional heightened-scrutiny analysis, including references to the history of 
                                                                                                                     
 45 See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 46 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 47 See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1491–
500 (2002); Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due 
Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 133–40 (2007); Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, 
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 1893, 1902–05 (2004); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 747, 748–50 (2011). 
 48 For a review of “equal protection fundamental interests” as part of an attempt to 
situate marriage equality within that body of doctrine, see Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. 
Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1413–21 (2010).  
 49 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 644 (1996). 
 50 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
 51 See Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. 
CT. REV. 183, 284–85; Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 887, 910–14 (2012).  
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anti-gay discrimination and the political obstacles to gay political gains,52 
along with two breezy assertions that sexual orientation is immutable.
53
  
These kinds of basic doctrinal questions about how Obergefell will play 
out in future cases are intensified by a striking fact: the majority opinion was 
written by the same justice who wrote every other Fourteenth Amendment 
opinion on lesbian and gay rights. Justice Kennedy wrote Romer, the first 
decision to apply the Equal Protection Clause to a gay rights claim in striking 
down a broadly worded ballot measure banning civil rights protections for 
lesbians, gays, and bisexuals;54 Lawrence, striking down the Texas ban on 
same-sex sodomy;55 and Windsor striking down the federal DOMA.56 One is 
hard pressed to think of any other hotly contested area of constitutional law in 
which one justice wrote every major decision over the course of two decades. 
The reason that Kennedy’s monopoly of authorship deepens questions 
about the case is that all of these opinions have a shared quality of doctrinal 
obscurity that raises uncertainty about how they will be understood and 
applied in the future, especially a future when Kennedy is no longer on the 
Court. His approach in these cases has the anomalous quality of being both 
unusual and consistent. Three shared traits tie together the majority opinions in 
Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell. First, they are full of lofty 
rhetoric. In Romer, for example, Justice Kennedy quoted Justice Harlan’s 
famous language from the Plessy v. Ferguson dissent in saying “that the 
Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,’”57 and 
called Colorado’s Amendment 2 “unprecedented in our jurisprudence” and 
“not within our constitutional tradition.”58 In Lawrence, he invoked the idea 
that criminalizing same-sex sodomy demeaned and deprived gay people of 
dignity and respect,
59
 and quoted the famously far-reaching language from 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey linking personal 
liberty to “the mystery of human life.”60 Ideas about dignity and respect 
likewise pervade Windsor and Obergefell, with references, for example, to the 
“dignity and status of immense import” that marriage confers61 and to the fact 
that “[i]t demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central 
                                                                                                                     
 52 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596–97 (2015). 
 53 Id. at 2594, 2596. 
 54 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.  
 55 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 56 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 57 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 58 Id. at 633. 
 59 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560, 570.  
 60 Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992) (plurality opinion)) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept 
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about 
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.”).  
 61 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681. 
1018 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:5 
institution of the Nation’s society” because such “couples, too, may aspire to 
the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest 
meaning.”62 
A second characteristic of these cases is that the ambitious rhetoric is not 
matched by doctrinal clarity or strength. To the contrary, the opinions 
conspicuously eschew the usual trappings of conventional constitutional 
standards of review. Romer seems to be a rational basis case, but does not 
follow the recognized formula of that doctrine. It instead heavily turns on a 
finding of animus that seems central to the analysis, yet is only sparsely 
explained.63 Lawrence fails to tell us whether it found a fundamental right, and 
left lower courts divided on that point.64 Windsor uses some combination of 
liberty, equality, and federalism, but again avoids conventional categories.65 In 
comparison to these earlier decisions, Obergefell seems, at first glance, like the 
most doctrinally conventional because it unambiguously says that same-sex 
couples have the fundamental right to marry.66 But that is where the doctrinal 
clarity ends. Under black letter rules, fundamental rights mean governmental 
regulation will be upheld only where there is a strong state interest and the law 
is closely drawn to meet that interest.67 Oddly, the opinion never clearly 
weights the government’s interest or assesses the fit between ends and means. 
One can search and find ideas in the opinion about why the ban on same-sex 
marriage is not justifiable, but they are not presented in terms of the standard 
approach.68 
The third feature of the Kennedy opinions is the one alluded to earlier in 
reviewing his approach in Obergefell—the consistent intertwining of liberty 
and equality, bringing together the two most significant clauses in Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The combination is promising, yet strikingly 
underspecified as a doctrinal matter. Thus far, it has mostly been left to 
scholarly efforts to elaborate a conceptual structure for this idea of a two-
clause symbiosis.69  
These qualities of Obergefell—its soaring rhetoric, doctrinal puzzles, and 
blended equality and liberty rationales—leave us with multiple questions. For 
example, has this approach replaced and finally interred more conventional 
doctrines, like the tiers of equal protection scrutiny? Is it to be applied beyond 
                                                                                                                     
 62 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
 63 Romer, 521 U.S. at 632, 644. 
 64 See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 191 (5th ed. 2014). 
 65 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681–96. 
 66 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 67 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (“When a statutory classification 
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless 
it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate 
only those interests.”). 
 68 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601–05. 
 69 Leading scholarly accounts are collected in supra note 47.  
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the realm of sexual orientation? And perhaps of greatest immediate relevance: 
Is it of consequence that Justice Kennedy’s distinctive approach has not yet 
been utilized by other members of the Court?  
2. The Court’s Role in a Democracy 
The Obergefell opinions should also become an object of fascination for 
legal scholars interested in classic questions about the role of courts in a 
democracy. The dissents sound the familiar alarm of judicial activism. The 
Chief Justice leaves subtlety aside here, not only criticizing the Court for 
“stealing”70 the issue from the people, but bringing in the heavy artillery of 
two of the most reviled cases in the Court’s history: Dred Scott71 and Lochner 
v. New York.72 And Roberts somewhat caustically tells those celebrating the 
opinion that it is fine to do so, with a caveat: “[D]o not celebrate the 
Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.”73 Justice Scalia’s dissent adopts a 
similar theme by calling the Court’s decision a “judicial Putsch,” and in doing 
so, invoking the German language for the second time in a gay rights dissent.74  
These lines of attack are, of course, numbingly familiar in constitutional 
law. But what is perhaps more interesting and novel is the degree to which the 
Justices explicitly discuss themes that could have been ripped from the pages 
of Professor Gerald Rosenberg’s classic book, The Hollow Hope.75 Rosenberg 
famously argues that courts cannot autonomously produce social change, and 
that activists misplace their faith in the judiciary when they should be using 
the political process to generate enduring reforms.76 His book originally 
focused on Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade as object lessons, 
but he issued a second edition in 2008, in the midst of anti-marriage equality 
backlash, to add the same-sex marriage debate to the list of examples of 
litigation gone awry.77  
Query whether Rosenberg would defend that position after Obergefell,78 
but irrespective of his own view, it is striking that the Justices so explicitly 
                                                                                                                     
 70 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 71 Id. at 2616–17 (discussing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)). 
 72 Id. at 2617–21 (discussing Lochner v. New York., 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 73 Id. at 2626. 
 74 Id. at 2629. In his dissent in Romer v. Evans, Justice Scalia argued that the majority 
had “mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 75 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 9 (1991). 
 76 Id.  
 77 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 339–420 (2d ed. 2008). 
 78 In relation to Rosenberg and other scholars, I have argued that the marriage debate 
counsels a more pragmatic approach that accounts for the fact that judicial decisions can 
produce both progress and backlash at the same time. Jane S. Schacter, Making Sense of 
the Marriage Debate, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1196–97 (2013) (book review).  
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addressed the question whether it would have been better for advocates of 
marriage equality to forego litigation and stick to the political process. This 
issue was perfectly framed for them by Judge Jeffrey Sutton, who had upheld 
the four state bans on same-sex marriage when Obergefell was in the Sixth 
Circuit.79 Sutton began his opinion with the line that “[t]his is a case about 
change—and how best to handle it under the United States Constitution.”80 He 
ended on the same theme, concluding:  
Better in this instance, we think, to allow change through the 
customary political processes, in which the people, gay and straight 
alike, become the heroes of their own stories by meeting each other 
not as adversaries in a court system but as fellow citizens seeking to 
resolve a new social issue in a fair-minded way.81 
At the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice continued in exactly this vein, 
making a pointed citation to the published lament of a “thoughtful 
commentator”—Justice Ginsburg—that premature judicial intervention in the 
abortion debate produced backlash and set back the cause of reproductive 
autonomy.82 He went on to assert that “however heartened the proponents of 
same-sex marriage might be on this day, it is worth acknowledging what they 
have lost, and lost forever: the opportunity to win the true acceptance that 
comes from persuading their fellow citizens of the justice of their cause.”83 He 
added that “they lose this just when the winds of change were freshening at 
their backs.”84  
The apparent role-shift here is striking. It is one thing for scholars like 
Gerry Rosenberg or Michael Klarman to consider, from an academic 
perspective, whether it is in some sense preferable—because more effective—
for advocates to win a significant victory through majoritarian versus judicial 
means.85 It is quite another for Supreme Court Justices to step into a role that 
casts them less as judges and more as strategists, focused on matters of timing 
and likely impact. Put differently, it is one thing for the Justices to say that the 
definition of marriage rightly belonged to the political branches. Roberts and 
the other dissenters all made that utterly standard claim. It is quite another 
thing to say that it would have been tactically wiser for plaintiffs in these cases 
                                                                                                                     
 79 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 418 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d, Obergefell v. Hodges, 
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to pursue political and not judicial recourse. The oddity of this chosen theme 
casts a different light on the Chief Justice’s provocative question: “Just who do 
we think we are?”86  
Justice Kennedy seemed to grasp exactly the question of institutional role 
raised by the Chief Justice’s argument. In response, he said that “[i]t is of no 
moment whether advocates of same-sex marriage now enjoy or lack 
momentum in the democratic process”87 He emphasized that the question 
before the Court was a “legal” one.88 He cited Bowers v. Hardwick as an 
example of the problems with the Court giving “a cautious endorsement of the 
democratic process”—problems of people continuing to be harmed and of 
“[d]ignitary wounds” that “cannot always be healed with the stroke of a 
pen.”89 And he relied on the canonical language in West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette, emphasizing that the very “idea of the Constitution 
‘was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to 
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.’”90 
Justice Kennedy’s strong—though predictable—retort begs the question 
why Chief Justice Roberts would have chosen to deploy this argument. A 
plausible hypothesis relates to the theme of this Article: he was writing for 
multiple audiences. The argument about tactics and timing allowed the Chief 
Justice to write for lay readers (the subject of the next Part) and for history. 
Roberts was at pains in his opinion to mention more than once that he did not 
begrudge same-sex couples this victory and to couch his objection as much, if 
not more, in terms of process (how this change should be made) than 
substance (whether it should be made at all). Seen in that light, his language 
seems less about doctrine than about positioning the Court in the socially and 
historically salient struggle over same-sex marriage.  
B. The Public as Audience 
A threshold question is to what extent the Justices were intending to speak 
to the public. There are textual clues that some were. As the last Part would 
suggest, the clearest comes from the Chief Justice’s dissent, and especially on 
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the points just discussed. Indeed, portions of the Roberts opinion were 
unambiguous about their target:  
 If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual 
orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate 
today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the 
opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the 
availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had 
nothing to do with it.91 
Less explicit, but to a similar effect: 
 Understand well what this dissent is about: It is not about whether, in my 
judgment, the institution of marriage should be changed to include same-sex 
couples. It is instead about whether, in our democratic republic, that decision 
should rest with the people acting through their elected representatives, or 
with five lawyers who happen to hold commissions authorizing them to 
resolve legal disputes according to law.92  
Justice Kennedy’s opinion did not address itself to “Americans” quite as 
literally, but it pursued its own distinctive form of exhortation. Kennedy noted 
that if the Court were to uphold the ban on same-sex marriage, “it would teach 
the Nation that these laws are in accord with our society’s most basic 
compact.”93 The idea that the Court’s opinions impart a lesson is consistent 
with Kennedy’s past pronouncements, including public remarks in 2008 
indicating that he considers it the role of judges to “teach” the Constitution 
through their opinions.94 This self-conscious mission of instruction offers 
explanatory context for Obergefell’s emphasis on rhetoric over doctrine, a 
quality that, we have seen, is also shown in Kennedy’s prior gay rights 
opinions. Eschewing standards of review and emphasizing dignity, respect and 
“[t]he centrality of marriage to the human condition”95 provide ways to speak 
beyond an audience of lawyers. A pedagogical objective of this sort also sheds 
light on the passages in the Obergefell majority opinion that seem carefully 
crafted to address those readers unlikely to agree with the outcome, such as 
Kennedy’s assurance that “[m]any who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong 
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reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable . . . premises”96 and are 
“reasonable and sincere people” who hold that view “in good faith.”97 Taking 
all of this together, it will not be surprising if we someday learn from the 
Justice’s papers or otherwise that he, indeed, did seek to speak to the country 
in this highly visible opinion, much as it was revealed that Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Felix Frankfurter had this function in mind in connection 
with Brown.
98
 
A final reason to surmise that the Justices would have contemplated the 
public as an audience is that they could not have failed to observe the 
enormous public interest in the case. From the heavy press coverage,99 to the 
scores of amicus briefs,100 to the well-covered lines to score entry to the 
argument,101 surely the Justices were aware of the intense attention being paid 
to Obergefell. Indeed, the Court’s decision to depart from normal practice and 
make the audio file of the oral argument immediately available to the public 
on the day of the argument was premised on exactly this high level of 
interest.102  
There is, moreover, a traditional stream of legal and political science 
scholarship that models the Court as a “republican schoolmaster,” executing 
precisely the task of educating the public about the law through its opinions.103 
While this approach has been debated from a number of perspectives, the most 
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fundamental objection has been an empirical one. If this model of a didactic 
court is to have traction, the public must—at the very least—consume judicial 
opinions in order to absorb the lessons. According to Gerald Rosenberg, 
however, decades of scholarship reveal that “most Americans are unaware the 
Court has acted, even on important issues,” and “do not have a clue as to what 
the Court is doing or has done.”104 Rosenberg points out, for example, that 
even in a case as visible as Roe v. Wade, there was (and remains) striking 
ignorance about the constitutional status of abortion.105 
Obergefell nicely raises the question whether the empirical critique of the 
“republican schoolmaster” might be out of date, at least in highly salient cases. 
The informational environment in which the Court operates today would 
suggest that the Justices have the ready capacity to address the country in their 
opinions if they wish to do so. In a case with as much public interest and 
visibility as Obergefell, would that capacity have been enough to drain the 
empirical critique of force?  
The enhanced ability of the Court to reach a wide audience flows 
principally from the Internet and social media. To appreciate the significance 
of this capacity, let us look first at some of the changes over the last half-
century in the informational environment in which the Court works. Loving, 
the Court’s last landmark case on marriage equality, provides an instructive 
comparison. Various differences between 2015 and 1967 underscore how 
limited the public’s access to the work of the Court was when that case was 
decided. For example, the Court audio-taped oral arguments in 1967, but the 
recordings were not made available until the following term, and even then 
were accessible only in the National Archives.106 Opinion announcements 
were not consistently recorded until the early 1990s.107 Opinions were handed 
out in hard copy to the small Supreme Court press corps, but not made widely 
available to the general public.108 Indeed, it was a reporter who informed 
lawyers for Mr. and Mrs. Loving that the Court had ruled in their favor.109 
And the Loving case, as significant as it was, generated relatively limited 
publicity. To use the New York Times as a benchmark, it published four stories 
addressing Loving on the day after the case was decided and none for the 
remainder of 1967.110 In fact, between 1958 (when the Lovings were married 
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and arrested soon thereafter) and 1967, the paper published only a total of 
fifteen stories about the litigation.111  
Compare Obergefell. The difference in New York Times coverage alone is 
striking. In contrast to the four stories the paper published about Loving from 
the decision date in May 1967 through the rest of the year,112 the Times 
published thirty-nine stories mentioning Obergefell,113 and some 497 stories 
mentioning “same-sex marriage” from June 26 through the remainder of 
2015.
114
 And the differences go far beyond newspaper coverage. As of 2015, 
oral arguments at the Supreme Court were taped, and the transcript was 
routinely made available later in the day of the argument.115 Typically, audio 
files were released at the end of the week of the argument, but in cases of great 
public interest, like Obergefell, the audio was made available the afternoon 
after the argument.116 And, of course, digital technology made the audio 
widely accessible all over the globe.  
The Obergefell decision itself was posted online immediately upon 
announcement of the decision.117 The SCOTUSblog’s “Live blog” reported 
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the outcome at 10:01 a.m.,118 at a time when over a half-million users were 
logged on that blog.119 The full decision was widely available online within 
moments at the SCOTUSblog,
120
 and at the Supreme Court’s own website. 
Perhaps more significantly, over the next few hours, the full opinions were 
available at a wide array of heavily trafficked websites. In fact, every website 
among the top ten news websites as of January 2015,121 and among the top ten 
digital-native news entities as of that date,122 covered the decision and each 
one offered readers a link to the full opinion. In almost all cases, the link to the 
full opinion was embedded in the site’s story on Obergefell;123 on a few sites, 
                                                                                                                     
 118 Amy Howe, #waitingforLyle: Live Blog of Opinions, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 
2015, 10:01 AM), http://live.scotusblog.com/Event/Live_blog_of_opinions__June_26_201 
5?Page=1 [https://perma.cc/2CNY-EJ9E].  
 119 Email from Andrew Hamm, Manager, SCOTUSBLOG, to author (July 20, 2016) (on 
file with author). 
 120 Howe, supra note 117.  
 121 Top 15 Most Popular News Websites: January 2015, IDEA WEB DEV. (Jan. 26, 
2015), http://ideawebdevelopment.com/top-15-most-popular-news-websites-january-2015/ 
[https://perma.cc/XDK4-CZNN]. 
 122 See Rick Edmonds, State of the News Media 2015—A New Ranking of Digital Sites, 
POYNTER (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.poynter.org/2015/state-of-the-news-media-2015-a-
new-ranking-of-digital-sites/339941/ [https://perma.cc/T2VN-RAWH]. 
 123 For stories in the top ten news websites, in order of rank, see Nat’l Constitution 
Ctr., Why June 26 is Already a Landmark Day for Gays and the Supreme Court, YAHOO! 
NEWS (June 26, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/why-june-26-already-landmark-day-
gays-supreme-095343150--politics.html?ref=gs [https://perma.cc/42GG-N5YE]; Dana 
Liebelson & Amanda Terkel, Supreme Court Legalizes Gay Marriage Nationwide, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/26/supreme-
court-gay-marriage_n_7470036.html [https://perma.cc/56S8-2H74]; Ariane de Vogue & 
Jeremy Diamond, Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Same-Sex Marriage Nationwide, CNN 
(June 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/26/politics/supreme-court-same-sex-
marriage-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/B2YA-ANC5]; John Schwartz, Highlights from the 
Supreme Court Decision on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/us/2014-term-supreme-court-decision-same-sex-
marriage.html?r=0 [https://perma.cc/9TXL-TXS9]; ‘Threat to Democracy’: See the 4 
Justices’ Dissent on Gay Marriage Ruling, FOX NEWS INSIDER (June 26, 2015), 
http://insider.foxnews.com/2015/06/26/quotes-scalia-thomas-roberts-alito-dissent-supreme-
court-gay-marriage-ruling [https://perma.cc/2PZF-8W66]; Pete Williams & Halimah 
Abdullah, Landmark: Supreme Court Rules Same-Sex Marriage Legal Nationwide, NBC 
NEWS (June 26, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/same-sex-marraige-legal-
nationwide-supreme-court-rules-n375551 [https://perma.cc/VD83-9S5T]; Robert Barnes, 
Supreme Court Rules Gay Couples Nationwide Have a Right to Marry, WASH. POST (June 
26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gay-marriage-and-other-major-
rulings-at-the-supreme-court/2015/06/25/ef75a120-1b6d-11e5-bd7f-4611a60dd8e5_story.h 
tml?asd [https://perma.cc/5NUL-D6Z5]; and Alan Yuhas et al., Supreme Court Legalises 
Gay Marriage Across the US—As It Happened, GUARDIAN (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/live/2015/jun/26/supreme-court-rules-same-sex-marriage 
[https://perma.cc/KCK7-45BA]. For stories in the top ten digital-native sites, see Liebelson 
& Tekel, supra; Chris Geidner, Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Nationwide Marriage 
2016] OBERGEFELL’S AUDIENCES 1027 
the opinions were linked in a separate story that was itself linked by the site’s 
own story.124 Either way, very shortly after the decision came down, the full 
text of the majority and all dissents were readily accessible to readers all over 
the world—including at “news” sites on these top-ten lists that were normally 
devoted to sports (Bleacher Report) and technology (CNET).125 
The instant and wide accessibility of Obergefell makes a sharp and 
striking contrast to Loving in 1967. Yet, standing alone, this ready digital 
access neither guarantees, nor necessarily even predicts, that broad swaths of 
the public would take advantage of this access. By analogy, the dramatically 
expanded access to information about politics and policy that the Internet 
facilitates does not necessarily mean new segments of the population will 
necessarily seek out or consume that information. In previous work, I have 
explored the ways in which the ready accessibility of digital information about 
Congress can meaningfully address the limited political accountability of that 
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body to the public.
126
 One reason for this limited accountability is the general 
public’s longstanding lack of knowledge about politics.127 In theory, the 
Internet offers a promising means of ameliorating this problem, but a line of 
research suggests that ready digital information about politics and government 
has mostly “activated the active”—that is, created better and faster political 
information for those already interested and engaged.128 Those not already 
interested in politics are likely to use the digital resources of the Internet to 
pursue other interests.  
One might hypothesize a similar effect in the context of the Supreme 
Court. I have found no research on the effect that ready digital access to full 
opinions has on public readership of those opinions in major cases. It would 
not, though, be surprising if many of those who click through from news 
websites to the opinions and read them carefully are those who are already 
interested in constitutional law or public policy. Indeed, it seems likely that a 
significant number of such readers are lawyers, rather than members of the 
“lay public” as I have defined it. In the case of Obergefell, perhaps broad 
interest in same-sex marriage would have been enough to spur more of the lay 
public to read the opinions, and thus bring new people into contact with the 
Court’s work product. Careful research would be useful on these points, but 
we can say, at the very least, that access to opinions cannot be equated with 
interest in, or consumption of, them.  
But the prompt availability of the formal opinions (and oral arguments) in 
Obergefell, while important, only begins to scratch the surface in terms of 
public access. Social media is a major factor to consider and is probably more 
important in terms of its effect on the mass public. A whopping two-thirds of 
all Americans use social networking sites, with usage almost ubiquitous 
among young people.
129
 Moreover, nearly two-thirds of Facebook’s and 
Twitter’s users report getting news from the two social media platforms,130 so 
it is reasonable to assume that the wide availability of stories about Obergefell 
was greatly intensified by social media. This ease of access could only have 
been expanded by the explosion of smart phones.  
In the case of Obergefell, Twitter and Facebook became rapid and 
powerful tools of dissemination with force-multiplying capacity. Within 
minutes of Obergefell coming down, news of the ruling flooded Facebook and 
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P3BJ-RJU9].  
 130 Joseph Lichterman, New Pew Data: More Americans Are Getting News on 
Facebook and Twitter, NIEMANLAB (July 14, 2015), http://www.niemanlab.org/2015/07/ne 
w-pew-data-more-americans-are-getting-news-on-facebook-and-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/ 
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Twitter. Indeed, in the first hour after the decision alone, 3.8 million people 
had used Facebook to communicate about it in some respect—including 
posting, sharing, and liking.131 On Twitter, there were 6.2 million messages in 
the first four hours, at a clip of 20,000 per minute.132 Between the hours of 
9:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. on the day of the decision, there were over 10 million 
tweets about Obergefell.133 On both Facebook and Twitter, hashtags like 
“#LoveWins” and “#LoveisLove” proliferated, as did rainbow avatars.134  
Responses to the decision from elected officials and office-seekers also 
quickly flooded social media. For example, the President promptly spoke out, 
and his tweet about Obergefell was later ranked the number one political tweet 
of 2015.135 Most of the Democratic and Republican nominees for President 
also tweeted promptly in reaction.136 Consider the following examples, in 
which a range of political elites quickly interpreted and framed the decision, 
and communicated about it to the public. Note that many of these statements 
echo themes sounded by the Justices themselves: 
 President Barack Obama tweeted: “Today is a big step in our march 
toward equality. . . . #LoveWins.”137 
 Barack Obama, in a Rose Garden speech, characterized the decision as 
“justice that arrives like a thunderbolt,” noting that the “ruling 
will . . . offer[] to all loving same-sex couples the dignity of marriage 
across this great land,” and that “compared to so many other issues, 
America’s shift has been so quick.”138  
                                                                                                                     
 131 Nick Corasaniti, On Social Media, an Outpouring of Support, Update in Supreme 
Court Rules on Gay Marriage—Highlights, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015, 3:10 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/live/supreme-court-rulings/on-facebook-an-outpouring-of-support/ 
[https://perma.cc/J87Z-KD75]. 
 132 Id.  
 133 Same-Sex Marriage Tweets Takeover the Internet, USA TODAY (June 27, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/06/27/same-sex-marriage-scotus-
gay-marriage-twitter-love-wins-trending/29389167/ [https://perma.cc/9X5B-46JL]. 
 134 Id.  
 135 Eliza Collins, Obama’s Gay-Marriage Message Tops List of Political Tweets, 
POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/twitter-top-political-
tweets-2015-216495 [https://perma.cc/MPD7-BJJY]. 
 136 Jonathan Topaz & Nick Gass, Republican Presidential Candidates Condemn Gay-
Marriage Ruling, POLITICO (June 26, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/201 
6-candidates-react-supreme-court-gay-marriage-ruling-119466 [https://perma.cc/Q85D-
9S45] (collecting reactions from candidates in both parties). 
 137 President Barack Obama (@POTUS), TWITTER (June 26, 2015, 7:10 AM), 
https://twitter.com/POTUS/status/614435467120001024 [https://perma.cc/J85A-SUHJ]. 
 138 Remarks by the President on the Supreme Court Decision on Marriage Equality, 
WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM (June 26, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/06/26/remarks-president-supreme-court-decision-marriage-equality [https://per 
ma.cc/2695-HJ6P]. 
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 Representative Jackie Speier tweeted a photo of the printed-out slip 
majority opinion, with margin note: “28 pages to say ‘love wins’!”139  
 Hillary Clinton, Democrat, former Senator and Secretary of State, and 
2016 Democratic nominee for President, posted on her Facebook 
page: “From Stonewall to the Supreme Court, the courage and 
determination of the LGBT community has changed hearts and 
changed laws.”140 
 Bernie Sanders, Democrat and then-presidential candidate, posted a 
statement that, “Today the Supreme Court fulfilled the words 
engraved upon its building: ‘Equal justice under law.’ This decision is 
a victory for same-sex couples across our country as well as all those 
seeking to live in a nation where every citizen is afforded equal rights. 
For far too long our justice system has marginalized the gay 
community and I am very glad the Court has finally caught up to the 
American people.”141 
 Donald Trump, Republican 2016 Republican nominee for President 
(and President-Elect as this Article goes to press), tweeted: “Once 
again the Bush appointed Supreme Court Justice John Roberts has let 
us down. Jeb pushed him hard! Remember!”142 
 Rick Santorum, Republican, former Senator and then-presidential 
candidate, tweeted: “Today, 5 unelected judges redefined the 
foundational unit of society. Now it is the people’s turn to speak 
#Marriage[.]”143 
 Jeb Bush, Republican, former Florida Governor and then-presidential 
candidate, stated that he believed the Court should have allowed the 
states to make this decision but that “[i]n a country as diverse as ours, 
good people who have opposing views should be able to live side by 
side. It is now crucial that as a country we protect religious freedom 
and the right of conscience and also not discriminate.”144  
                                                                                                                     
 139 Representative Jackie Speier (@RepSpeier), TWITTER (June 26, 2015, 10:48 AM), 
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 Carly Fiorina, Republican and then-presidential candidate, posted on 
Facebook: “This is only the latest example of an activist Court 
ignoring its constitutional duty to say what the law is and not what the 
law should be. Justice Alito spoke for so many of us when he said that 
‘[t]oday’s decision usurps the constitutional right of the people to 
decide whether to keep or alter the traditional understanding of 
marriage . . . All Americans, whatever their thinking on that issue, 
should worry about what the majority’s claim of power portends.’”145 
 John Boehner, Republican and then-Speaker of the House, tweeted a 
link to his statement, which expressed disappointment “that the 
Supreme Court disregarded the democratically-enacted will of 
millions of Americans by forcing states to redefine the institution of 
marriage.”146  
 Marco Rubio, Republican Florida Senator and then-presidential 
candidate, stated that while he did not agree “with this decision, we 
live in a republic and must abide by the law. As we look ahead, it must 
be a priority of the next president to nominate judges and justices 
committed to applying the Constitution as written and originally 
understood.”147  
 Chris Christie, Republican, New Jersey Governor and then-
presidential candidate, stated that he agreed with Chief Justice Roberts 
and that the decision “should be decided by the people and not 
by . . . five lawyers.”148 He also said, “I don’t agree with the way it 
was done. But it’s been done and those of us who take an oath have a 
responsibility to abide by that oath.”149  
There were many electronic ways for people to get excerpts or salient lines 
from the opinions, and social media amplified these channels of 
communication. For example, an ideologically diverse array of online 
publications published selected lines from the opinions within hours of the 
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decision’s release.150 In addition, many individuals also tweeted language 
from the opinions. For example, a Radian6 search of Twitter revealed that 
31,163 tweets specifically mentioned the name of the case, “Obergefell,” 
between June 26, when it was decided, and June 30.151 Some 16,222 tweets 
included this passage from the end of the majority opinion: “They ask for 
equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that 
right.”152 Over 2,000 tweeted one of the following terms from a dissent: 
“judicial Putsch,” “Just who do we think we are,” or “But do not celebrate the 
Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.”153 Because this does not account for 
“likes” of tweets, nor for how many people simply received and read those 
tweets, we do not have a precise count of the numbers of people who were 
exposed to language from the opinion in this way. And, of course, this is only 
Twitter, and does not attempt to account for Facebook, YouTube, Snapchat, or 
other social media. While the numbers of individuals tweeting specific 
language from the opinions are not overwhelming, this glimpse at Twitter 
provides an intriguing snapshot of what is made possible by the contemporary 
digital environment. Social media offers a channel through which the Court’s 
words can reach many people who would otherwise never see them.  
There is an irony involved with journalists or individuals tweeting snippets 
of an opinion. For many years, the Court has opposed cameras in its 
courtroom. This is still a matter of apparent agreement among most of the 
Justices, who fear the reduction of law to soundbites.
154
 But social media can 
permit something very much like that, as illustrated by the Obergefell reaction. 
Tweeting language from a lengthy opinion in 140 characters can surely strip 
language from context and permit significant reductionism. 
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It seems certain that many more people engaged with Obergefell through 
social media on a very general level, one not involving reading language from 
the opinion. Consider that from June 26–June 30, 2015, 8,984,233 tweets 
around the world used the hashtag “#LoveWins,”155 the hashtag that Obama 
had used in his early tweet. But even this can be a way that the Court’s work 
“teaches” the public something about constitutional values.  
To some degree, the tweeting and retweeting of information from or about 
Obergefell might be analogized to newspapers very briefly excerpting or 
characterizing opinions at the time of Loving. But there are important 
differences: Social media allows this material to reach people who do not read 
newspapers, it blasts out the content almost immediately, and it allows people 
to readily participate by assessing what the Court has done and by reading or 
responding to the assessments of others. This mode of active public 
engagement with the Court can simultaneously involve more people, and 
engage them differently, than in the past. Granted Obergefell is no run of the 
mill case, and it would be folly to generalize about public attention to the work 
of the Court based on this case and the issue of same-sex marriage alone. But 
to return to where we began, the ways in which a groundbreaking Fourteenth 
Amendment opinion can be absorbed and understood by a public audience 
today stands in sharp contrast to what was possible at the time of earlier 
landmarks.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
I have disaggregated legal from lay audiences as a way to underscore the 
different perspectives brought to bear on Obergefell. In the case of 
conventional legal audiences, I have highlighted some doctrinal and theoretical 
issues of particular interest. In the case of the public audience, I have 
emphasized what the Internet and social media can facilitate. This sketch can 
render no verdict on whether the “republican schoolmaster” approach is 
meaningfully strengthened by the easy flow of digital information about the 
Court. On this point, it is worth noting that the interactive nature of social 
media and the Internet suggest that the public is not plausibly modeled as a 
passive group of students who simply absorb “lessons” directly from the 
Justices. Any lessons are likely to be shaped by the reactions and commentary 
of others. Still, the current media environment is suggestive of interesting 
ways in which lay citizens may learn about what the Court does and how 
public officials, movement leaders, public intellectuals, and other citizens 
respond to it.  
Beyond disaggregating audiences and exploring what the digital 
environment might open up, there are dynamic aspects of the Court’s multiple 
audiences to probe. In particular, there are reasons to believe that the very 
existence of an expanded public audience might help shape what the Court 
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writes for its conventional legal audience. The way that the Internet and social 
media have radically enhanced the accessibility of Supreme Court opinions is, 
presumably, not lost on the Justices. Whether or not they consume digital 
reactions to their work, they surely know that their opinions are more widely 
and quickly available than they have ever been, and that their decisions are 
easily drawn into the currents of pitched debates taking place in the political—
not judicial—process.  
In fact, litigation has been part and parcel of high-profile political and 
social debates for many years. In his recent book, Thomas Keck has ably 
traced the rise of litigation as a staple political tactic for the opposing sides in 
culture wars issues.
156
 In the realm of same-sex marriage, Keck analyzes the 
ways in which gay rights groups sued to pursue marriage equality and block 
anti-marriage equality measures at the state and federal level, and sympathetic 
elected officials filed their own litigation to pursue marriage equality.
157
 
Groups supporting traditional marriage did the same, by seeking to block 
executive action in favor of same-sex marriage—such as Mayor Gavin 
Newsom’s decision to license same-sex marriage in 2004—and by opposing 
other pro-marriage equality initiatives.
158
 They also did so by filing free speech 
and religious liberty-based litigation to shield court clerks like Kim Davis 
from having to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and bakers, 
photographers, wedding planners and others from having to do business with 
same-sex couples wishing to marry.
159
 
Given the tight linkages between political and legal advocacy on the 
marriage issue, it should not be surprising that the Obergefell opinions 
resonated with some of the strongest themes emphasized by advocates in 
political and cultural debates. For example, for many years, the political 
campaign for marriage equality deployed rhetoric stressing the uniquely 
venerated status of marriage and positing its core importance to individuals 
and society.
160
 Justice Kennedy used very similar rhetoric in his opinion at a 
number of points, asserting “the transcendent importance of marriage” and 
“[t]he centrality of marriage to the human condition,” and concluding that 
“[n]o union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals 
                                                                                                                     
 156 See generally THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES (2014) 
(discussing debates about other gay rights questions, affirmative action, abortion, and 
guns). 
 157 Id. at 34–38. 
 158 Id. at 79. 
 159 Id. at 80; Tiffany C. Graham, Obergefell and Resistance, 84 UMKC L. REV. 715, 
725–31 (2016).  
 160 See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, The Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 84 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 379, 381 (2009) (noting that activists and courts had spoken of marriage as “the 
highest form of human happiness” and a “vital social institution,” among other expressions 
of reverent praise (first quoting ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT 
ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 156 (1995); and then quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003))). 
2016] OBERGEFELL’S AUDIENCES 1035 
of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.”161 As we have seen, the 
dissenting Justices pushed very hard on accusations of judicial activism, a 
theme that had likewise animated anti-same sex marriage advocates from the 
outset of the debate.
162
 Relatedly, Justice Scalia also emphatically accused the 
majority of elitism, a theme he had pressed in his earlier gay rights dissents.
163
 
This, too, is an attack frequently made in political debates about marriage 
equality.
164
 And Justice Alito lamented the victimization of religious objectors 
to same-sex marriage, predicting that the decision would “be used to vilify 
Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy,”165 and tartly 
observing that he “assume[d] that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to 
whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes,” but that “if they repeat 
those views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots.”166 This defense 
of religious objectors as a disadvantaged minority had become a mainstay of 
supporters of traditional marriage well before Obergefell.
167
  
I do not mean to suggest that the Justices are necessarily parroting political 
arguments, though some may be using their opinions to signal constituencies 
outside the Court. In truth, these political arguments about same-sex marriage 
were themselves to some degree shaped by constitutional ideas and rhetoric.168 
That is, the flow of information between litigation and politics is two-way, not 
one-way. At the very least, though, we can observe the coarsening of the 
debate among the Justices and how, at times, it resonates with the harsh tenor 
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of the larger national political debate.
169
 The key point is that litigation is part 
of the political struggle over issues like same-sex marriage, so the arguments 
in one domain, unsurprisingly, find their way into the other.  
Moreover, given how polarized partisan politics are today, especially on 
cultural issues like same-sex marriage,
170
 when the Justices make these kinds 
of arguments, they are bound to be swept into the polarized polity—whether 
they intend to do so or not. In this sense, the Obergefell opinion begins to 
seem more like the Justices speaking with the country rather than to it. That is, 
even if the opinions may aspire to stand outside partisan politics, it is difficult 
for them to do so and to resist being quickly absorbed within those politics. 
This is especially true given that media and news habits are polarized, too.
171
 
Many of those who encountered online accounts of Obergefell likely did so 
through links supplied by ideologically-compatible sources online. Indeed, 
many of the tweets172 and “best of Obergefell”173 lines noted earlier were 
probably selectively seen because of the ideological filtering that has become 
common on the Internet.174 
All of this suggests that the context in which the Court operates is shaped 
not only by the rise of the Internet and social media, but also by extreme 
partisan polarization and ideological fragmentation. It is likely as difficult for 
the Justices to reach and meaningfully communicate with a broad national 
audience as it is for any other public official to do so under current 
circumstances. These current political conditions, in turn, pose their own 
obstacle to the aspirational “republican schoolmaster”—one that is distinct 
from the traditional empirical challenge to that model grounded in the idea the 
public is simply too poorly informed about the Court to be a meaningful object 
of teaching. The republican schoolmaster issue aside, the dynamics of the 
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Internet and social media expose the Court’s work to an expanded and 
different kind of audience that can bring the Court into political debates in new 
ways. As my analysis of the Obergefell opinions suggest, that is a 
phenomenon with which lawyers, judges, and scholars—the Court’s 
conventional audience—must grapple.  
